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Issue BRIEF
SUMMARY
In a review of the evidence,
the authors find that the
ACA had minimal effect on
employment, hours of work,
and compensation. This brief
provides critical perspective
on the effects of reforms
on labor markets for federal
and state policymakers as
they consider changing or
repealing the law.
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HOW HAS THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT AFFECTED WORK
AND WAGES?
Jean Abraham, PhD and Anne Beeson Royalty, PhD

One of the most contentious issues around the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was how it would
influence labor supply and demand, the structure of jobs, and compensation. Whether the ACA
is revised, repealed, replaced, or remains intact, it is important to understand how federal health
reform affects the U.S. labor market. In this issue brief, we summarize the evidence regarding the
impact of the ACA on these employment outcomes, and identify challenges and opportunities for
further research.

ACA PROVISIONS THAT COULD INFLUENCE
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
The ACA increased individuals’ access to insurance through a variety of mechanisms that could
also affect employment outcomes. The law expanded access to private insurance for young adults;
broadened eligibility criteria for Medicaid in states that chose to expand; introduced subsidized
private insurance in newly-created Marketplaces; and created a new regulatory environment for
private insurance markets.
Young Adults. Adopted in September 2010, the young adult dependents provision allows
individuals up to age 26 to enroll in their parents’ health plan. The provision could affect young
adults’ employment in a number of ways: it might alter their incentives to work in jobs that offer
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI); it might reduce their labor supply if they can work fewer hours
and maintain the same standard of living because they don’t explicitly pay for their own health
insurance; and it might increase wages if they move to jobs without insurance or if employers with
many young adult workers drop coverage and compensate by raising wages.
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Income-based coverage expansions. In January 2014, 25 states and the District of Columbia
expanded eligibility for Medicaid to individuals with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty
Level (FPL). Access to private coverage also expanded with the introduction of income-based
premium and cost-sharing subsidies for individual coverage offered in newly-created Marketplaces.
These coverage expansions could encourage individuals to reduce their labor supply and incomes
to either qualify for Medicaid or increase their subsidies on the Marketplace. In addition, because of
improved access to health insurance separate from the employer-based system, workers might have
greater mobility and flexibility, including the choice to work at small firms, which are less likely to
offer health insurance, or self-employment.
Employer incentives. The ACA included several provisions designed to maintain or expand
the existing employer-based system. The employer shared responsibility requirement (ESRR)
hedged against the possibility that employers would drop health insurance they offer and send
their workers to the Marketplace. Specifically, firms with at least 50 full-time equivalent workers
face an annualized penalty of $2,000 per full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit on
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the Marketplace. The ESRR also includes financial penalties for large employers that offer
“unaffordable” coverage based on a measure of out-of-pocket premiums relative to a worker’s
household income. The ESRR was delayed and revised in terms of its phase-in for mid-sized
(50-99 workers) and large firms (100 or more workers). To encourage insurance offers among
small, low-wage firms, the ACA included a small business tax credit. While these provisions were
meant to affect employers’ economic incentives to offer insurance, two other possible employer
responses include changing their demand for labor (e.g., reducing the number of workers and
firm size) and modifying the structure of jobs (e.g., shifting from full-time to part-time workers or
using more temporary or contract workers).
New Regulatory Environment. Several new regulations were introduced for the individual
and small employer market segments in 2014, including essential health benefits, standardized
products (“metal levels”), modified community rating (rating only on age, tobacco use, family
composition, and geography), and a prohibition on insurers denying coverage to individuals
with pre-existing conditions. The employment effects of this new regulatory environment span
both labor supply and compensation. Notably, they might increase the likelihood that older
workers choose to retire prior to age 65, when most become eligible for Medicare. They might
also affect workers’ wages if small employers face higher premiums because of a broad set of
essential health benefits or modified community rating. Finally, the ACA included an excise tax
on the high cost health plans (“Cadillac Tax”) to discourage employers from offering extremely
generous policies that most economists believe encourage overconsumption of medical care
by individuals. Originally proposed for 2018, the Cadillac Tax is now delayed until 2020. If
implemented, it is likely that affected employers would reduce the generosity of health insurance
offerings and possibly increase other forms of compensation such as wages.
The following table summarizes these key provisions and their hypothesized effects on
employment outcomes.
TABLE 1.
Employment Outcome
Summary of Published
(Hypothesized Overall
Literature
Effect)

Employment
Category

ACA Provision(s) that can affect this
employment category

Labor Supply

•Y
 oung adult dependent coverage
expansion (2010)
•M
 edicaid eligibility expansion (2014)
•S
 ubsidized Marketplace coverage (2014)
• Individual market regulations
(e.g., modified community rating,
ban pre-existing conditions) (2014)

Any employment (-)
Usual hours per week (-)
Part-time (+)
Retirement (+)

None of the hypothesized
effects were detected. The
one exception was Antwi
et al. (2013) found a decline
in usual hours per week for
young adults.

Job Mobility

•Y
 oung adult dependent coverage
expansion (2010)
•M
 edicaid eligibility expansion (2014)
•S
 ubsidized Marketplace coverage (2014)

Switching jobs (+)
Self-employment (+)

None of the hypothesized
effects were detected.
Insufficient evidence for
self employment outcomes.

Labor
Demand

•E
 mployer shared responsibility requirement
(2015/2016)

Percentage of part-time
workers (+)
Number of workers
at firm (-)

Insufficient evidence to
establish labor demand
effects of the ACA.

Compensation

•Y
 oung adult dependent coverage
expansion (2010)
•S
 mall employer health tax credit (2010)
•E
 ssential health benefits and modified
community rating regulations (2014)
•E
 mployer shared responsibility requirement
(2015/2016)
• Individual mandate (2014)
•C
 adillac Tax (2020)

Wages (+/-)
ESI Offers (+/-)
ESI Eligibility (-)

WAGES: no impact on
wages from the young
adult dependent coverage
mandate and Insufficient
evidence for 2014 coverage
expansion provisions.
OFFERS: Stable
ELIGIBILITY: no
association detected
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CURRENT EVIDENCE ON ACA AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
Employment and Hours of Work

MANY OF THE ANTICIPATED
EFFECTS OF THE ACA
ON EMPLOYMENT DID
NOT MATERIALIZE.

Three studies have utilized difference-in-difference estimation techniques to compare changes
in employment outcomes in response to the young adult mandate for those affected by the
policy (e.g., 19-25 years old) to those who are similar but not affected. Antwi, Moriya, and Simon
(2013) found that the policy was associated with no effect on employment, a 3% reduction in usual
hours of work, and a 5.8% reduction in the probability of working full-time. However, the authors
acknowledged that the results were suggestive, since employment outcomes were not the focus
of the paper. Using longitudinal tax records from 2008-2012 and difference-in-differences models,
Heim, Lurie, and Simon (2015) linked tax records of parents and children to identify parents with
access to ESI, and found no changes in employment and wages linked to the young adult provision.
Bailey and Chorny (2016) used monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data from May 2008
to June 2013 to examine whether the young adult mandate encouraged individuals’ propensity to
change jobs, and found no effect.
Three studies investigated the impact of the 2014 coverage expansion provisions on employment
and hours of work. Moriya, Selden, and Simon (2016) used the 2005-2015 CPS to look at trends
in part-time work. Overall, they found no evidence of a shift toward part-time work, but note some
imprecise evidence of a shift for those with less education and older workers 60 to 64 years of age.
Using the 2008-2014 CPS, Mathur, Slovov, and Strain (2016) examined the impact of the ACA on
part-time work (defined as working 25-29 hours versus 31-35 hours) for industries and occupations
most likely to be affected by the coverage expansion, and again, found no effects. However, their
data extended only to 2014, before the employer mandate went into effect. Using 2005-2015 CPS
data, Gooptu et al. (2016) investigated whether individuals in Medicaid expansion states exhibited
changes in any employment, part-time employment, or job switching, and found no evidence
of any employment responses overall or for those in lower income groups (versus higher income
groups).
Several working papers have also examined hours of work. Kaestner et al. (NBER Working Paper
2015) analyzed usual hours of work and the probability of full-time work (> 30 hours per week) for
a sample of 22-64 year olds with a high school degree or less. They found almost no effects on
either employment outcome in the post-coverage expansion period, a result in line with most of
the published work. On the other hand, two working papers focus on part-time employment and
found substantially different results. Unlike the published papers, these studies distinguish between
voluntary part-time employment and involuntary part-time employment (the result of employers
shifting workers from full-time to part-time). Even and Macpherson (2016) use data 1994-2015
CPS data on non-elderly workers without a college degree to estimate the average percentage
that are in involuntary part-time employment and whether this percentage is higher than expected
in 2014. Dillender, Heinrich, and Houseman (2016) examine involuntary part-time employment as
well, but their design relies upon the fact that Hawaii already had in place an employer mandate
and therefore could serve as a comparison group to other U.S. states. Both studies find evidence
of increases in involuntary part-time employment in occupations and industries that are most likely
to be affected by the ESRR. Notably, these papers have to assume that employers were already
responding to the ESRR before it went into full effect.
A final working paper focuses on the effect of the ACA coverage expansion on part-time work
and retirement decisions among older workers. Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2015) found no
evidence to suggest either an increase in part-time work or an increased probability of retirement
among those 55-64 years of age in states that expanded Medicaid versus those that did not.

3

LDI

Issue BRIEF

Compensation

THE ACA HAS HAD VIRTUALLY
NO EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT,
HOURS WORKED, ESI OFFERS,
JOB MOBILITY, OR WAGES.

Evidence on the impact of the ACA on workers’ compensation, including health insurance and
wages, is more limited. Blavin et al. (2015) examined trends in access to ESI between June 2013
and September 2014, and found no changes in rates of ESI offers overall as well as by firm size
or family income level. Recent work by Abraham, Royalty, and Drake (2016) uses the 2014
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component to examine changes in health insurance
offers among private-sector U.S. employers. The authors found that more than 95 percent of
establishments either continued offering coverage or continued not offering coverage between
2013 and 2014. Fewer than 3.5 percent of establishments dropped coverage and 1.1 percent added
coverage. Establishments that dropped coverage were disproportionately small and low-wage.
The authors found no effects of state-level ACA policy variables (e.g., Medicaid income eligibility
changes, modified community rating in the small group market, and Marketplace type) on the
probability of dropping or adding health insurance offers.
Thus far, little evidence exists on the effect of ACA on workers’ wages. Heim, Lurie, and Simon
(2015) found that the young adult mandate had no significant effect on the wages of young adults.
On the other hand, a working paper by Goda, Farid, and Bhattacharya (2016) compared states that
had mandated young adult dependent coverage before the ACA, with states newly implementing
the ACA mandate, and found a negative effect of the ACA young adult mandate on wages.
Surprisingly, the estimated effect was significant only among non-parents.

Summary

In summary, with only one exception, the literature published to date finds virtually no effect of
the ACA on employment, hours of work, ESI offers, job mobility, or wages in the first two years.
Some working papers are in accord with the published literature while at least two come to different
conclusions about the effect of the ACA on involuntary part-time employment. Research will
continue as more data become available, and estimated effects may change over time.

CHALLENGES FOR THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY
Researchers evaluating the impact of the ACA on employment outcomes face a number of
challenges. We briefly describe three of them below.
Isolating the Effect of Specific ACA Provisions on Employment Outcomes. Since many ACA
provisions were enacted on a national level at the same time, it is often challenging for researchers
to design studies that can provide estimates of the causal effect of the policy, and difficult if not
impossible to isolate the effect of any one provision on an outcome of interest.
Data and Measurement Challenges. Measurement issues persist with respect to key outcomes
(e.g., hours of work that tend to have “heaping” at round numbers) and a lack of standardization
regarding how one classifies full-time versus part-time status. Researchers also face challenges in
measuring how policies are implemented. For example, while researchers studying the impact of
Marketplaces on employment outcomes may be able to capture structural measures about type
(e.g., federally-facilitated versus state-based), it may be more difficult to measure how well or poorly
a Marketplace was implemented, which might influence outcomes.
Uncertainty in the Environment and Timeframe. It is hard to know the extent to which many
“null” or small results are driven by the political uncertainty related to ACA implementation,
including the Supreme Court decisions, delay in implementation of the ESRR, and the continued
volatility of Marketplaces in these initial years. As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to
evaluate the ACA impacts as new legislation and/or regulations begin to confound employer and
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individual decisions. Uncertainty about the future of the ACA has only become more acute after
Trump’s victory in the Presidential election and the Republicans’ continued control of the Senate
since it is unclear what exactly will replace the law if, as expected, the current law is repealed.

DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS
Our review of the current evidence suggests that the effect of the ACA on employment, hours of
work, and compensation have been negligible, to date. However, the published work, of necessity,
used only early years of data, so additional research is needed to follow up on these studies. If the
ACA remains in place at least in the short run, useful future work would include investigation of
how employment and hours of work are affected by Marketplace functioning over time. Second,
full implementation of the ESRR did not occur until 2016. Work will be needed to understand
employers’ responses, including whether firm sizes are changing around the 50 full-time equivalent
threshold and whether insurance provision (e.g., offers and eligibility) is changing based upon
longer-run Marketplace functioning or regulatory changes such as states choosing to alter the
definition of a small firm from 50 to 100 workers.
If the ACA is repealed, past and future research evaluating features of the law will still be
informative for states interested in implementing a state-level health care reform, assuming they are
given the chance to implement their own changes by a federal law replacing the ACA. Notably,
states will be able to use past research reviewed here and future research to understand whether
and to what extent the ACA affected work and wages. State policymakers can use that evidence to
inform state-level decisions about a new, more decentralized form of health care reform.
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